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OBTAINING AN ENFORCEABLE DIVISION OF
THE MARITAL ESTATE:
NOW A MATTER OF PREVENTIVE LAW
IN NORTH DAKOTA
JESSE C. TRENTADUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a fifteen-month period the North Dakota Supreme
Court rendered two decisions that not only greatly affected the
standard of care required of attorneys practicing in the area of
domestic relations law, but also significantly impaired the
enforcement of many cash-based property divisions. These
decisions were Dvorak v. Dvorak' and Seablom v. Seablom. 2
The holdings in Dvorak and Seablom are relatively simple:
Execution rather than civil contempt is the proper remedy for
enforcement of property-splitting payments in a divorce decree,
3
and the North Dakota exemption laws apply to executions on
divorce judgments. 4 Unfortunately, the potential impact of these
cases is neither so simple nor so narrow in scope. Dvorak and Seablom
present a very real threat to the enforcement of executory property
divisions in many North Dakota divorce decrees.
II. BACKGROUND
This article will discuss and analyze the Dvorak and Seablom
Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law; B.A., University of Southern
California, 1969;J.D., University of Idaho, 1975; member of the North Dakota and Idaho Bars.
1. 329 N.W.2d 868 (N.D. 1983).
2. 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
3. Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 873 (N.D. 1983).
4. Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D. 1984).
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rulings. Its primary focus, however, will be on how to minimize the
effects of these cases.
A. Dvorak
The pivotal issue in Dvorak was whether the district court could
utilize its civil contempt powers to collect moneys owed pursuant to
a court-approved property settlement.5 The parties had entered
into a property settlement agreement which provided for the
payment of certain sums of money to the husband. 6 This stipulated
division of the marital estate was incorporated into a divorce decree
entered by the Traill County District Court. 7  The wife
subsequently refused to make the required payments, 8 and the
husband instituted contempt proceedings. 9
The district court found the wife in contempt of court and
5. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 872. A district court's contempt authority is governed by statute. See
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-10-03 to -27 (1974 and Supp. 1985). At the time Dvorak was decided, § 27-
10-03(3) of the North Dakota Century Code contained the jurisdictional grant for civil contempt
and provided in part that:
Every court of record of this state may punish as for a civil contempt any person
guilty of a neglect or violation of a duty or other misconduct by which a right or
remedy of a party to a civil action or proceeding pending in such court may be
defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced in the following cases:
3. A party to an action or proceeding, an attorney, or other person, for the
nonpayment of a sum of money ordered by the court to be paid in a case where by law
execution cannot be awarded for the collection of such sum, or for any other
disobedience to any lawful order,judgment, or process of the court.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-03(3) (1974) (emphasis added).
6. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 869.
7. Id. The wife was required to pay the husband $1,250 by October 31, 1981; she was also
required to pay the husband's summer school tuition at a college in Colorado. Id. The trial court
further ordered that Mrs. Dvorak pay her former husband one-half of an investment fund even
though the settlement did not specifically provide for this payment. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. When a party commits contempt outside the immediate view and presence of the court,
the other party brings the matter to the court's attention through an affidavit. N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-10-07 (1974). If the contents of the affidavit indicate that the accused has committed a
contemptible offense, the judge can either order the accused to appear and show cause why he
should not be punished for the claimed offense, or issue a warrant of attachment directing the sheriff
to arrest and bring the accused before the court. Id.
The trial court used an order to show cause to institute contempt proceedings in Dvorak. 329
N.W.2d at 869. Show cause is a common procedure for raising the issue of civil contempt in domestic
relation cases. See, e.g., Thorlakso v. Wells, 207 N.W.2d 326, 327 (N.D. 1973) (district court issued
three show cause orders against husband who was delinquent in his alimony payments); Svihla v.
Svihla, 126 N.W.2d 135, 137 (N.D. 1964) (show cause on failure to pay child support, alimony, and
attorney's fees);Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 395, 36 N.W.2d 554, 557 (1949) (show cause for
falure to pay prejudgment support and suit moneys). Although district courts may prefer to address
the issue of contempt with a show cause order, they can initiate civil contempt proceedings in
domestic relations cases with a writ of attachment. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 304 N.W.2d 694,
694 (N.D. 1981) (wife assigned support rights to the Social Service Board of North Dakota, which
proceeded on a writ of attachment against delinquent father). The evidence necessary to prove civil
contempt must be clear and satisfactory. See Svihla, 126 N.W.2d at 140-41 (reviewing previous
degrees of proof necessary to establish contempt).
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ordered her to purge the contempt by paying the moneys owed. 10
Mrs. Dvorak appealed, and the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the finding of contempt. 11 The Dvorak court was cognizant
of the wife's intentional noncompliance with the judgment, but it
held that contempt was not available as a remedy for enforcing the
property-splitting portions of divorce judgments. 12
In addressing the contempt issue, the supreme court stressed
that the moneys in question were a debt rather than support, 13 and
the debt aspect of the judgment rendered it unenforceable through
contempt.14 The court reasoned that using ccntempt to collect
moneys representing a property distribution was not permitted by
statute1 5 and violated the state constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. 16
The Dvorak court held that execution is the proper method for
10. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 870. It is not clear from the opinion whether the district court's
contempt finding applied to the tuition payment. See id. If it did, the Dvorak decision raises serious
doubts about the availability of civil contempt to enforce any divorce judgment provision other than
support payments. For a discussion of the possible impact of Dvorak on the enforcement ofjudgment-
ordered payments to third parties, see infra note 52.
11. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873.
12. Id. The wife claimed she did not comply with the judgment because the husband had
obtained the settlement through fraud. Id. at 870.
13. Id. at 873. District courts are authorized by statute to provide for the support of a spouse as
well as minor children, and the support can be either temporary or permanent. N.D. CENT. CODE 5§
14-05-23 to -24 (1981). Since court-ordered support payments are not considered a debt, they are
enforceable against a former spouse through the district court's civil contempt authority. See Raszler
v. Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535 (N.D. 1956); Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 399, 36 N.W.2d 554, 559
(1949).
14. See Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873.
15. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-10-03(3) (1974). For the relevant text of this statute see supra note
5. The court in Dvorak held that S 27-10-03(3) permits a party to use civil contempt when, by law,
execution is not available as a remedy. 329 N.W.2d at 873. Because the husband could use execution
to enforce the judgment in question, the moneys were not collectable through the district court's
contempt powers. Id.
16. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873. The court in Dvorak stated that other jurisdictions have
considered the question of employing civil contempt to enforce the property -splitting provisions of a
divorce decree, and have found such use of the court's civil contempt power to be constitutionally
prohibited. Id, The Dvorak opinion contains neither direct reference to nor analysis of these
authorities. See id. Instead, the court listed an encyclopedic reference which indicated that hany state
constitutions prohibit imprisonment for debt, and courts in those states cannot use their civil
contempt authority to enforce the property-splitting provisions of a divorce judgment. Id. There is
also strong authority that supports the use of civil contempt to enforce cash property divisions, but
the Dvorak decision did not aderess these cases.
North Dakota and South Dakota, for example, share common organic law. See Enabling Act of
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington
Enabling Act). Section 25-4-44 of the South Dakota Codified Laws Annotated authorizes the courts
of that state to make an "equitable division" of the property with the granting ofa divorce. See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 25-4-44 (1984). Section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code is North
Dakota's counterpart and empowers the courts of this state to make an "equitable distribution" of
the property. N.D. CENT. Cone § 14-05-24 (1981).
Article I, § 15 of the North Dakota Constitution governs imprisonment for debt, and it states
that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt unless upon refusal to deliver up his estate for the
benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law; or in cases of tort; or where
there is strong presumption of fraud." N.D. CONST. art. I, S 15. The comparable provision of the
South Dakota Constitution is article VI, S 15, and it provides that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned
for debt arising out ofor founded upon a contract." S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
The language in the South Dakota Constitution indicates a much stronger prohibition against
imprisonment for debt than does North Dakota's. The South Dakota provision makes no exception
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enforcing property-splitting provisions in a divorce judgment. 7 To
execute on a debt, however, a creditor must first obtain a writ.' 8
Once a writ is obtained, the sheriff must levy on the property and
hold a sheriff's sale. 19 After the sale, the proceeds are distributed to
the creditors,20 and the debtor has one year to redeem the
property. 21 There are also strict notice and time requirements
associated with execution. 22
The foregoing factors make execution a more cumbersome
for fraud, tort, or refusal to deliver property to creditors. See id. The prohibition is absolute if the debt
is founded on contract. Id. Yet the South Dakota Supreme Court has held that to accomplish an
agreed-upon division of property in a divorce proceeding, the trial court must have the power of civil
contempt to punish a willful and contumacious failure to pay money ordered by the judgment.
Hanks v. Hanks, 334 N.W.2d 856, 857 (S.D. 1983).
The distinction between Hanks and Dvorak lies in how each court views a property settlement.
North Dakota sees property settlements as contractual in nature. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873. The
view taken by the South Dakota Supreme Court is that an agreed-upon cash settlement is not the
consequence of a contract, but an obligation created by the court to divide the property interests of
the parties. Hanks, 334 N.W.2d at 857.
17. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873.
18. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-21-04 (1974). The party in whose favor a judgment has been
given may enforce that judgment by a writ of execution. Id. Section 28-21-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code governs the contents of a writ of execution, and provides that the instrument "must be
issued in the name of the state of North Dakota, be attested in the name of the judge, sealed with the
seal of the court and subscribed by the clerk." Id. 5 28-21-06 (Supp. 1985). Along with the names of
the parties and actual amount due, a writ of execution must intelligibly identify and refer to the
judgment by stating the court and county where entered. Id. Lastly, the writ must give the sheriff or
other officer specific and statutorily mandated directions as to what action he is to take. Id.
19. See id. §§ 28-21-11, 28-23-01 to -14 (1974 & Supp. 1985). There are two kinds of execution;
one for the delivery of property, both real and personal, and another against the property of a
judgment debtor for the collection of moneys. Id. § 28-21-03 (1974). Seealso N.D.R. Ctv. P. 70. The
execution for WIllection of money involves a sale of the debtor's less liquid assets. See N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 28-21-11 (Supp. 1985). If the assets levied upon the money, drafts, promissory notes, or
other paper of similar character, they can be appropriated by the officer without being advertised or
sold. Id. § 28-21-14 (1974).
Sales of property under a writ of execution must be made by the officer at public auction and to
the highest bidder. Id. 5 28-23-07. "After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution no
more shall be sold." Id. When the judgment debtor is present at the sale, he or she may direct the
order in which the real or personal property is sold and the officer must follow these directives. Id. If
the levy is upon crops, the judgment creditor may opt to have the sale at the nearest usual market for
such grain or produce. Id. 5 28-23-02. Perishable property may be sold at the place, time, and
manner prescribed by the court in an order permitting such sale. Id. S 28-23-03. The officer must sell
personal property upon the premises of the owner if the owner so requests and agrees to keep that
property safe until the day of the public auction; otherwise the sale will be at the place designated by
the sheriff. Id. § 28-23-06. Real property must be sold at the courthouse in the county where the
property is located. Id. § 28-23-05.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-21-11 (Supp. 1985). When the property sells for more than the
amount required to satisfy the judgment and expenses of sale, the surplus goes to the judgment
debtor. Id. § 28-23-09 (1974). If the officer has another writ of execution in hand on which the
surplus moneys may rightfully be applied, he or she may use the surplus moneys to satisfy this second
writ rather than return the money to thejudgment debtor. Id.
21. See id. § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1985). The judgment debtor has one year following the sale within
which to redeem real property. Id. There is no right to redeem personal property sold at a sheriff's
sale.
22. See id. S 28-21-12 (Supp. 1985). The sheriff or other officer must execute the writ by levying
on the property of the debtor. Id. S 28-21-11. If the levy is upon personal property, the officer must
give the debtor, the debtor's attorney, agent, or spouse a copy of the writ. Id. § 28-21-12. The copy
provided must state upon its face that the debtor has 10 days to claim the exemptions from execution
allowed by law. Id. Failure to deliver a copy of the writ of execution to the person from whom
personal property is taken renders the levy void. Langer v. Nultemeier, 55 N.D. 132, 137, 212 N.W.
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remedy than civil contempt.2 3 The loss of an expedient and cost-
efficient tool for the enforcement of a judgment-ordered property
division was not the only important consequence of the Dvorak
decision. With its emphasis upon execution as the proper remedy,
the supreme court had apparently begun to view divorce-generated
property divisions as part of an ordinary debtor-creditor
relationship. 2
B. Seablom
Seablom gave the court occasion to reconsider the
appropriateness of execution as a vehicle for enforcing a deferred
cash-payment property division, and to redefine the relationship
existing between the parties after entry of a divorce judgment. 25
The key issue in Seablom was whether the North Dakota exemption
laws applied to property that was part of the marital estate. 26 The
court held that North Dakota's exemption laws applied to
executions under the property-splitting portions of a divorce
judgment. 27 In doing so, the North Dakota Supreme Court clearly
cast former husbands and wives in the role of debtors and creditors.
The parties in Seablom had been married twenty-two years. 28
They had no children, and had accumulated a considerable amount
of property during the course of their marriage. 29 In addition to a
home and the usual items of personalty, the Seabloms owned
vehicles, farm machinery, farmland, and crops. 30
817, 819 (1927).
Before property subject to a levy can be sold, the officer making the sale must give public notice
of the time and place of sale in the manner prescribed by statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-23-04
(1974). The court to which the execution is returnable must set aside all sales made without the
notice required by law. Id. The North Dakota Century Code contains similar notice requirements for
the sale of crops and other personal property. Id. §5 28-23-01, -02.
23. For a discussion of the contempt procedure, see supra note 9. When the contempt involves a
failure to pay, the law requires the offending party to pay not only the sums owed, but also costs and
expenses of enforcement. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-04 (1974). The ease of initiating a civil contempt
action and the ability to recover attorney's fees and costs made it an attractive remedy in domestic
relations cases up until the Dvorak and Seablom rulings. For a discussion of the changes in the use of
contempt, see infra note 52.
24. See Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873. A debtor-creditor relationship does not exist in matters of
child and spousal support. Whether founded upon statute, the common law, natural law, or religious
tenets, marriage and parenting are unique among social institutions, and nowhere is this more
apparent than in obligations of support. Support is a duty, not a debt. See Hodous v. Hodous, 76
N.D. 392, 398, 36 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1949) (support-ordered pendente lite); Karteus v. Karteus, 67
N.D. 297, 272 N.W. 185 (1937) (post-judgment support); cf. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575,
577 (1901) (in deciding whether arrears of alimony were dischargeable in bankruptcy, the Court
noted that alimony is not founded on contract, but on the natural and legal duty of a husband to
support his wife).
25. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920.
26. Id. at 925-26.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 922.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The Seabloms, both fully aware of their financial state, agreed
upon a property settlement and presented it to the court for
approval. 31 This proposed settlement gave the wife the family home
and various items of personal property. 32 The husband was to have
the farm, farm. machinery, and crops. 33 The settlement further
provided that the wife was to receive $14,400 in alimony payable at
the rate of $400 per month for thirty-six consecutive months. 34
These alimony payments were not to terminate upon the death or
remarriage of either party. 35
An additional $25,000 lump sum cash property settlement was
to be paid to the wife within sixty days after entry of judgment. 36
The parties owned the farmland as joint tenants. 37 Thus, they
attempted to secure payment of the $25,000 by agreeing that Mrs.
31. Id. In both content and language the Seablom property settlement agreement is similar to
agreements used by other North Dakota attorneys. For this reason, the key provisions of the Seablom
property settlement are reproduced in footnotes 33, 35, 36, and 38.
32. Id. at 922.
33. Id. The property settlement agreement stated the assets that Mr. Seablom was to receive as
follows:
3. The following assets are awarded to the plaintiff as his exclusive property:
1) All farm machinery, including trucks;
2) The small tools and equipment;
3) All crops on hand or growing;
4) The Northeast Quarter of Section 2, Township 147 North, Range 51 West, Traill
County, North Dakota;
5) The Southeast Quarter of Section 2, Township 148 North, Range 50 West, Traill
County, North Dakota;
6) The IRA account in the name ofJohn Seablom at First State Bank of Buxton;
7) The checking account in the name ofJohn Seablom at First State Bank of Buxton;
and
8) The plaintiff's personal effects and papers now in the defendant's possession.
Appendix to Brief at 27, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). Notwithstanding Mr.
Seablom's failure to make the payments required by judgment, this provision was sufficient to vest
him with title to some of the property. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the passing of title byjudgment.
34. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922.
35. Id. The settlement stated the alimony agreement in the following manner:
10. That the plaintiff shall pay unto the defendant as and for alimony the further
sum of $14,400.00 payable in 36 consecutive monthly installments at the rate of
$400.00 per month commencing on the 15th day of May, 1982, and payable on the
15th day of the month thereafter until paid in full. These payments shall not be
terminated due to the death or remarriage of either party. The plaintiffmay prepay all
or part of this amount at any time.
Appendix to Briefat 28, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
36. 348 N.W.2d at 922. Paragraph nine of the settlement agreement set out this lump sum
property division as follows:
9. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of Twenty-five Thousand
Dollars ($25,000.00) which is due within 60 days of the date ofjudgment.
Appendix to Brief at 28, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
37. Appendix to Briefat 18-19, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
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Seablom would not execute or deliver deeds or other instruments of
title until she received the lump sum.38
The district court approved the proposed settlement and
incorporated it into the judgment of divorce. 39 The husband made
the monthly alimony payments for several months but then
stopped.4 0  Mr. Seablom likewise never paid the $25,000 cash
property settlement. 4 1 Mrs. Seablom commenced proceedings to
collect all sums owed under the judgment. 42
Mrs. Seablom chose the remedy of civil contempt to bring the
matter of delinquent alimony payments to the district court's
attention.4 3 The Traill County District Court issued a show cause
order which was served on the husband. 44 The district court then
held a hearing on the contempt matter, but found that the
purported alimony was a division of property and not spousal
support.4 5 Based upon this finding, the judge concluded that the
district court's civil contempt power could not be used to compel
the husband's payment. 46
Mrs. Seablom attempted to collect the $25,000 cash payment
by a writ of execution, but was equally unsuccessful in that
attempt. 47 The sheriff returned the writ unsatisfied because Mr.
38. 348 N.W.2d at 922. The settlement agreement stated the security arrangement as follows:
11. Upon payment of the $25,000.00 amount referred to above, each party shall
execute and deliver to the other such instruments of title or conveyance which may be
necessary to effect the foregoing division of property.
Id. This manner of securing the post judgment payment of a cash property division may no longer be
acceptable due to the Seablom decision. Seablom now makes it possible for the debtor spouse to default
on his payment and still retain possession of the property. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying
text for an illustration of how Seablom has rendered such security devices ineffective.
39. 348 N.W.2d at 922.
40. Appendix to Brief at 63, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
41. See Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Appendix to Brief at 34-36, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
45. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922. The North Dakota Century Code requires that an order to
show cause be answered with an affidavit. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-13 (1974). John Seablom
did file a sworn statement in which he claimed, in essence, that his liabilities were such that he could
not pay either the alimony or property settlement. Appendix to Brief at 38-39, Seablom v. Seablom,
348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
Mr. Seablom had incurred debts following his divorce from Carole, and these obligations were
secured by mortgages and other encumbrances on his property. Appendix to Brief at 70-90, Seablom
v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). Mr. Seablom's ability to encumber the assets received
from the marital estate resulted in a reduction of equity. Id. at 50-52. This loss of equity prevented
Mrs. Seablom from executing on the encumbered property. Id.
46. See Appendix to Brief at 110, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). The trial
court actually held that execution was the only remedy available for enforcement of the $400 monthly
payment. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922. Ironically, while finding that this monthly payment was a
division of property rather than support, the district court noted the wife's "delicate situation" and
commented that "[s~he has no source of income to live on and is now faced with the remedy of
execution." Appendix to Brief at 110, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N .W.2d 920 (N .D. 1984).
47. 34P N.W.2d at 922.
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Seablom claimed all of his property as exempt under North Dakota
law. 48
On appeal Mrs. Seablom argued that the trial court had erred
in finding the $400 monthly payment to be a division of property
instead of spousal support. 49 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's finding on this issue, and went on to
clarify and expand its ruling in Dvorak.50 The Seablom court stated
that civil contempt and execution were mutually exclusive
remedies. 5' Thus, when execution is available as a remedy the
disctict court lacks the authority to enforce a judgment through
civil contempt. 52
Mrs. Seablom argued that even if the monthly payments were
a division of property, they, along with the $25,000 cash property
settlement, could be satisfied out of the former marital estate
48. Id.; Appendix to Brief at 96-97, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). It is a
relatively simple matter to claim the exemptions allowed by law. The claimant only need deliver to
the sheriff or officer serving the writ of execution a schedule of property claimed as exempt. N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 28-22-07 (Supp. 1985). The debtor must make the claim within 10 days of notice of the
levy. Id. §§ 28-21-12, 28-22-06 (1974 & Supp. 1985). The debtor, his agent, or his attorney must
subscribe and swear to the schedule. Id. § 28-22-07 (Supp. 1985). Property not included on the
schedule is not exempt. Id.
49. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 923.
50. Id. at 925.
51. Id.
52. Id. By holding that civil contempt will not lie when execution is potentially available as a
remedy, the Seablom court may have severely restricted the district courts' ability to enforce other
forms of property division. For example, divorce judgments often make specific awards of personal
or real property to the parties. Execution is available as a remedy for delivery of both real and
personal property. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5§ 28-21-03 to -04 (1974); N.D.R. Civ. P. 70. District
courts therefore no longer have the authority to compel the post judgment delivery of assets awarded
to one party but in the possession of the other.
Seablom likewise presents a problem with the enforcement of court-ordered payments to third
parties. When a judgment orders one of-the parties to assume and pay obligations of the marriage, is
thejudgment enforceable through the district court's civil contempt authority?
If the wife's refusal to pay college tuition for her former husband was a part of the district court's
erroneous contempt ruling in Dvorak, contempt should not be available to compel payments to
creditors of the marriage. There is little to distinguish payments to creditors from nondebt-related
payments, albeit tuition, to a third party. Assuming Dvorak held that contempt was not a proper
remedy to compel tuition payments, it is doubtful that civil contempt would be available as a remedy
to force judgment-ordered payments to creditors of the marriage. Cf Spence v. Spence, 290 Mich.
98, 104, 287 N.W. 393, 395-96 (1939) (husband's agreement to carry insurance and to provide for
former wife in his will was a property settlement not enforceable through contempt).
Payments to creditors could arguably be support or alimony rather than a division of property.
The terms "alimony" or "support" are generally used and understood by the courts to mean an
allowance paid to a former spouse for support and maintenance. See, e.g., Spence, 290 Mich. at 104,
287 N.W. at 396 (defining alimony as payment for support and.maintenance of ex-spouse). North
Dakota law does not specifically provide for payment of support solely to third parties. See N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-23 to -24 (1981). Unless the husband is required to pay both the former spouse
or creditor in the alternative, and the judgment contains a hold harmless provision for the wife,
payments to third parties may not constitute nondischargeable support. Cf Stamper v. Stamper, 17
Bankr. 216, 219 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (although payments to third parties alone cannot be
nondischargeable spousal support under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, a bankruptcy court
may interpret these payments as support when the judgment also contains a hold harmless provision
in favor of the wife); Hodous, 76 N.D. at 400, 36 N.W.2d at 559 (court cannot properly order
payment of suit moneys directly to attorney, but the order may provide for payment to either former
spouse or attorney). See also H. R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 6319-20 (wherein Congress states its intention that a debtor's
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notwithstanding the exemption laws. 53 The former wife contended
that the statutory exemptions did not apply to executions under a
divorce judgment when the property subject to levy had originally
been part of the marital estate.54
The Seablom court disposed of this issue in a summary fashion.
Recognizing what it termed an "obvious injustice," the North
Dakota Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the exemption
statutes did apply. 55 There were, in short, no assets upon which
Mrs. Seablom coald execute in order to enforce the court-decreed
property division. 56
Seablom is, for a multitude of reasons, a troubling decision.
There is first the obvious injustice noted by the court. Mrs.
Seablom had desperate need of these funds to support herself. 57 She
had worked to acquire this property and more importantly, both
Mrs. Seablom and her husband had agreed upon an equitable
distribution which the court approved. 58 At no time during the
divorce proceedings did the husband indicate on the record that he
was either unable to abide by the agreement or that he might
otherwise have difficulty complying with the terms of the proposed
settlement. 59 Nonetheless, because the property division took the
form of post judgment payments, it was uncollectable. The
payments were uncollectable whether the husband's failure to
comply with the judgment was willful or due solely to financial and
other conditions beyond his control. 60
Seablom also raises questions about the wife's interest, if any, in
the real and personal property awarded to the husband. Did the
language used in that judgment pass title to the husband free and
clear of any claim by the wife, or did Mrs. Seablom retain a
security or other ownership interest in these assets? The court
indicated that Mrs. Seablom was a secured creditor on the $25,000
agrcement to hold his former spouse harmless on joint debts may qualify as nondischargeablz
support under II U.S.C. § 523 (1972)).
53. Scablom, 348 N.W.2d at 923.
54. Id. at 925.
55. Id. at 925-26.
56. Id. at 922, 925.
57. See supra note 46 for the trial court's assessment ofCarole Seablom's financial condition.
58. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922.
59. See Appendix to Brief at 70-90, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). The
district court thoroughly discussed the proposed settlement with the parties prior to approving it.
Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 922. If Mr. Seablom knew that he would have difficulty complying with the
terms of the proposed settlement, he was under a duty to disclose this fact, and his failure to do so
might have permitted the trial court to set aside the judgment. Cf Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331
N.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Minn. 1983) (the parties have a duty to make a full and accurate disclosure of
all assets and liabilities, and a breach of this duty constitutes sufficient fraud for the court to set aside
the judgment of divorce).
60. Appendix to Brief at 38-39, 50-52, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984); see
Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873 (a district court could not resort to civil contempt even if the wife willfully
19851
310 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:301
payment. 61 She was secured because the judgment provided that no
deed or instrument of title would be executed or delivered until the
$25,000 was paid. 6 2 However, Mrs. Seablom enjoyed no such
protected status on that portion of the judgment determined to be a
division of property instead of alimony. 63
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of Seablom is that the trial
court's judgment transformed the parties into nothing more than
an ordinary debtor and creditor. No obligation of fairness or
fiduciary duty between the parties existed after the divorce. 64 This
is particularly troubling because prior to Seablom, divorced parties
had rarely been treated as having a purely debtor-creditor
relationship.
Divorce pleadings are generally not couched in terms of a
debtor-creditor relationship, nor are the proceedings or judgments
or orders eventually entered by the court. Nevertheless, after
Dvorak and Seablom, the law of debtor and creditor relations will
determine the enforceability of property divisions. Under this body
of law, the deferred payments contained in many North Dakota
divorce judgments are no longer enforceable. 65
refused to comply with the decree). The district court found that Mr. Seablom's refusal to pay was
not willful, but this finding was challenged on appeal. Appendix to Brief at 110-11, Seablom v.
Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 920. The North Dakota Supreme Court did not address this issue because
it determined that civil contempt was not a proper remedy to enforce the divorce judgment. 348
N.W.2d at 923.
61. 348 N.W.2d at 924.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 924-25. Docketing thejudgment would make Mrs. Seablom ajudgment lien holder of
record on the real property. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-13 (Supp. 1985). No lien would attach to
the personal property until it was levied upon by the sheriff. See id. § 28-21-13 (1974). Moreover,
since the claimed exemptions precluded levying upon the personal property, there was no lien. See id.
§ 28-22-01 (Supp. 1985). Even if the court determined that Mrs. Seablom was ajudgment lien holder
on all of the property, she would still be unable to levy on the property exempted from execution. See
td. § 28-20-13, ch. 28-22 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
64. See Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 924. This ruling is all the more perplexing in view of the duties of
good faith and fair dealing generally imposed by law upon husband and wife during and after divorce
proceedings. See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 75 N.D. 253, 27 N.W.2d 576 (1947). In Barker the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that a divorce did not leave the parties in the same position they would
have been in had the marriage never taken place. Id. at 259, 27 N.W.2d at 580. The fact that the
parties in Barker had been married gave rise to a confidential relationship between them. Id. at 260-
61, 27 N.W.2d at 581. This relationship required the husband to deal fairly and in good faith with
his former wife in the post judgment joint purchase ofa home. Id. at 262-63, 27 N.W.2d at 581-82.
65. See Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925. If the property division requires a post judgment cash
payment, the creditor spouse cannot use civil contempt to collect the moneys. Id. A creditor spouse
likewise cannot resort to civil contempt proceedings to force delivery of property. In addition, district
courts may no longer be able to employ civil contempt to enforce judgments requiring one party to
assume and pay debts or other obligations of the marriage. See supra note 52 and accompanying text
concerning the impact of Dvorak and Seablom upon a district court's ability to compel a former
spouse's payment of marital debts.
While execution is a remedy in theory, it is not always an available remedy in practice because
of the stringent notice, time, and procedural requirements associated with levy and sale. See supra
notes 18-22 for a discussion of the cumbersome process of execution. Now that the absolute
exemptions from execution apply to attempts at collecting divorce judgments, execution is even less
viable as a remedy. See Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925.
Bankruptcy likewise affords no remedy, especially when the debtor spouse is a farmer. A farmer
may voluntarily choose to subject himself to bankruptcy but he cannot be involuntarily placed into
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C. LEGISLATIVE REACTION
In 1985 the North Dakota Legislature attempted to fill the
enforcement void created by Dvorak and Seablom with the
introduction of House Bill 1486.66 This bill authorized district
courts to enforce money judgment property distributions with civil
contempt, and further provided that a creditor spouse could
execute free of the exemptions contained in chapter 28-22 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 67 House Bill 1486 did not vest district
judges with civil contempt authority over nonmoney judgment
property divisions, 68 nor did it deprive the debtor spouse of all
exemptions from execution contained in the North Dakota Century
Code. 69 Yet, despite its obvious shortcomings, the bill would have
solved many of the divorce judgment enforcement problems facing
North Dakota creditor spouses. 70
The Senate Judiciary Committee initially recommended
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982). Furthermore, North Dakota's statutory exemptions are
specifically applicable to bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE
28-22-17 (Supp. 1985).
66. See H.B. 1486, 49th Leg., 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 570.
67. See id. As introduced House Bill 1486 provided, in pertinent part, that:
SECTION 1. A new section to 14-05 of the North Dakota Century Code is
hereby created and enacted to read as follows:
Money judgment to secure division of property enforceable by contempt
proceedings - Exemptions from process not available. Failure to comply with the
provisions of a money judgment within a divorce decree relating to distribution of the
property of the parties may be punished as civil contempt. A party may also execute
on the money judgment, and the obligor is not entitled to the exemptions from process
set forth in chapter 28-22.
SECTIO '2. A new section to chapter 14-06 of the North Dakota Century Code
is hereby created and enacted to read as follows:
Money judgment to secure division of property enforceable by contempt -
Exemptions from process not available. Failure to comply with provisions of a money
judgment within a decree of separation relating to distribution of the property of the
parties may be punished as civil contempt. A party may also execute on the money
judgment, and the obligor is not entitled to the exemptions from process set forth in
chapter 28-22.
SECTION 3. AMENDMENT. Section 28-22-01 of the 1983 Supplement to the
North Dakota Century Code is hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows:
28-22-01. Property exempt from all process. Except as otherwise provided, the
property mentioned in this chapter is exempt to the head of a family, as defined by
section 28-22-01.1, from attachment or mesne process and from levy and sale upon
execution and from any other final process issued from any court.
Id.
68. See id. For a discussion of nonmoney property division, see supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
69. See H.B. 1486, 49th Leg., 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 570. There are numerous other exemptions
from execution not contained in chapter 28-22 of the North Dakota Century Code. See, e.g, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-39.1-13 (1981) (teacher's retirement annuities and refunds); 18-05-11 (1981)
(firemen's pensions); 37-25-07 (1980) (Vietnam Veteran's adjusted compensation); 40-45-23 (1983)
(police pensions); 52-06-30 (Supp. 1985) (unemployment benefits); 54-52-12 (1982) (state
employee's retirement benefits); 65-05-29 (1985) (workmen's compensation benefits).
70. Denying a-debtor spouse all exemptions from execution would have been more beneficial to
the creditor spouse, but the most important exemptions contained in chapter 28-22 of the North
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House Bill 1486 for passage,71 but the committee later reconsidered
and suggested that the proposed legislation be amended. 72 In
addition to expanding a district court's contempt- authority to
include enforcement of any property-splitting provisions, the
amendments also restored to the debtor spouse all exemptions from
execution in chapter 28-22 except those contained in section 28-22-
02 of the North Dakota Century Code. 73 House Bill 1486 became
law with the suggested amendments. 74
This new law appears to make it easier to enforce the property-.
splitting provisions in North Dakota divorce decrees; however, it is
not likely to do so. The expanded civil contempt authority given
district judges, for example, will have little if any effect upon the
enforcement of divorce judgments. If the judgment is founded on a
property settlement agreement, the property-splitting provisions
are contractual obligations and thus are not enforceable through
the district court's civil contempt powers. 75 The use of contempt to
enforce property settlement agreements incorporated into a divorce
decree is generally considered imprisonment for debt.7 6 In all
likelihood, the new law would not overcome this constitutional
proscription. 77 Although it may still be possible to enforce court-
determined property divisions with civil contempt,78 this remedy
can only be employed when the debtor spouse's refusal to comply
with the divorce decree is willful and not merely a result of his
financial inability to comply. 79
The best solution to the problem of enforcing the property
Dakota Century Code were included in the house bill. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-22-01 to -05
(Supp. 1985). Depriving a former husband of these major exemptions would give the creditor spouse
access to a substantial portion of the formerly exempt property, including the homestead and crops.
See id 5 28-22-02.
71. See N.D. SENATEJOURNAL, 49th Leg., at 881 (1985).
72. Seeid- at 1659.
73. See Divorce Property Division Enforcement Act, ch. 192, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 570
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-25.1, 14-06-03.1, 28-22-01 (Supp. 1985)).
74. See id.
75. See Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d at 873.
76. See id.
77. Insofar as this new law is found to contravene the North Dakota Constitution, it will be
declared invalid. See IA N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.20 (Sands 4th ed.
1985).
78. As enacted, House Bill 1486 modifies Seablom in one important area. This statute appears to
allow the use of civil contempt in conjunction with execution, which was not possible under the
mutually exclusive remedy rationale of Seablom. Compare Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925 (civil contempt
statutorily not available when the remedy of execution exists) with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-25.1
(Supp. 1985) and 14-06-03.1 (Supp. 1985) (current codifications of House Bill 1486, wherein district
courts are vested with civil contempt authority). By removing the restrictive use of civil contempt as a
remedy, the North Dakota Legislature may have made possible the enforcement of court -determined
property divisions with civil contempt. For a discussion of the possibility of using civil contempt to
enforce court -determined property divisions, see supra note 16 and accompanying text. Of course,
even limited use of civil contempt would disappear if the North Dakota Supreme Court should
subsequently decide that this also constitutes imprisonment for debt.
79. Cf Pritchett v. State, 379 So. 2d 616 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (imprisonment for contempt
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distributions in divorce decrees lies ntt in changing the enforcement
laws, but in changing the exemption laws. If the debtor spouse were
denied all exemptions, Mrs. Seablom and similarly situated
spouses would have access to property that was formerly part of the
marital estate, and would have a better possibility of receiving their
rightful share through the process of levy and sale. The North
Dakota Legislature, however, has refused to deprive debtor spouses
of all their statutory exemptions. House Bill 1486 was specifically
amended to permit a debtor spouse to claim the absolute
exemptions contained in section 28-22-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code, and these are undoubtedly the most significant
exemptions provided to debtors. 80 For all practical purposes, Dvorak
and Seablom still remain real obstacles to the post judgment
enforcement of many marital property divisions.
III. DVORAK AND SEABLOM AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING
AND POSSIBLY DISCHARGING CASH-BASED
PROPERTY DIVISIONS THROUGH BANKRUPTCY
North Dakota statutory exemptions vary according to the
profession of the claimant; some vocations are more favored by the
exemption laws than others.8 ' Therefore, the full potential of Dvorak
and Seablom can best be understood when viewed against a
background of laws related to a particular commercial activity such
as farming. Farming is a particularly good choice not only because
it is a common occupation in North Dakota, but also because
divorces involving farm couples present a fertile opportunity for
avoiding and perhaps discharging cash-based property divisions.
A. AVOIDANCE OF DEFERRED PAYMENT PROPERTY DIVISIONS
Whether the property is divided by agreement of the parties or
by order of the court following trial, it is not unusual for the
husband to receive the farmland and for the wife to receive a cash
settlement.82 This cash payment may be in a lump sum or in
should never be imposed when failure to pay alimony is a result of an inability to pay instead of
contumacy). The trial court can still punish with contempt if the defaulting party voluntarily placed
himself in a position where he was unable to pay. See Hodous, 76 N.D. at 401, 36 N.W.2d at 560.
Encumbering assets in excess of value appears to constitute good faith inability to pay. See Pritchett,
379 So. 2dat 616-17.
80. See infra notes 92-101 for a discussion of the significance of the absolute exemptions in
avoiding court-decreed property distributions.
81. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 18-05-11 (1981) (firemen's pensions are exempt from
execution); 28-22-02(8) (Supp. 1983) (farmers are allowed to exempt the crops and grains grown on
160 acres of land);40-45-23 (1983) (police pensions are exempt from execution).
82. Lippert v. Lippert, 353 N.W.2d 333 (N.D. 1984) (wife received one-half mineral interest in
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installments, and it is most often made after judgment has been
entered. 83 However, because of fluctuating land values and the
amount of property a farmer may claim as exempt from execution,
settling property rights with deferred payments is no longer an
advisable practice.
The principal statutory exemptions from execution are
contained in chapter 28-22 of the North Dakota Century Code.84
This chapter sets forth the manner in which a debtor may claim
exemptions.8 5 The statute provides that all property listed as
exempt is free "from attachment or mesne process and from levy
and sale upon execution and from any other final process issued
from any court. '"86 The exemptions themselves fall into four
categories: absolute exemptions, 8 7  additional exemptions for
residents,88  specific alternative exemptions, 89  and additional
farm in addition to cash settlement); Pankow v. Pankow, 347 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 1984) (wife's initial
award was a monthly cash payment over twenty-five years); Tuff v. Tuff, 333 N.W.2d 421 (N.D.
1983) (wife received cash settlement). A sampling of recent North Dakota cases reveals that this is
not an uncommon occurrence. The supreme court remanded many of these cases for further
proceedings, but none were reversed on the grounds that it was improper to give the wife a cash
settlement rather than specific assets. Irrespective of the North Dakota Supreme Court's ruling in
each instance, these cases may well reflect a district court preference for gender-based property
divisions. See, e.g., Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 336-37 (court determined division with farm to husband
and wife to receive cash, remanded for a redetermination of value of marital estate); Pankow, 347
N.W.2d at 569 (court awarded farm to husband with post judgment payments to wife, remand to
determine present value of wife's share and possible reassessment of property division based upon
present value); Tuft, 333 N.W.2d at 424 (husband received farm, remanded for determination of net
worth and reduction of future payments to present value); cf. Urlaub v. Urlaub, 348 N.W.2d 454
(N.D. 1984) (affirming district court's award of farmland to husband and alimony to wife); Williams
v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 1981) (grant of farm to husband and $31,200 alimony to wife
reversed and remanded for determination of net worth and possible reassessment of property
division).
83. See, e.g., Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 335 (wife to receive $40,000 cash within 120 days after entry
ofjudgment plus $10,000 yearly payments for 20 years); Pankow, 347 N.W.2d at 568 (wife awarded
$575 in monthly payments for period of 25 years as her share of estate); Tuff, 333 N.W.2d at 422
($50,000 lump-sum payment to wife, $150,000 to be paid in yearly installments over a 10 year
interval). The supreme court was concerned that the installment payments in Lippert, Pankow, and
Tuff either include interest, or be reduced to present value. See Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 336; Pankow,
347 N.W.2d at 568; Tuff, 333 N.W.2d at 424. The court was not troubled by the fact that in each
instance the wife was to receive her share over a period of years, or that the judgments did not
provide for securing the payments.
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-22-02 to -05. (Supp. 1985). Other exemptions are provided
under North Dakota law, but these are no longer effective against a creditor spouse. See id. § 14-05-
25.1, 14-06-03.1, 28-22-01.
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-07 (Supp. 1985).
86. Id. § 28-22-01. Because their major objectives are to provide the judgment debtor with a
fresh start and to reduce the numbers of debtors who need public assistance, exemption statutes are
remedial in nature and liberally construed. Seablorn, 348 N.W.2d at 925.
at 925.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02 (Supp. 1985). A debtor has the right to dispose of absolutely
exempt property free of unsecured creditors' claims. Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 73 N.D. 174,
189, 12 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1944). It is proper to convert nonexempt property into exempt property
through sales and exchanges. See Bates v. Callender, 3 Dakota 256, 265, 16 N.W. 506, 510 (N.D.
1883). This ability to deal freely with noncollateral assets to make the best use of statutory
exemptions cannot be over-emphasized; it is the method by which Dvorak and Seablom may eventually
render a large number of existing divorcejudgments unenforceable.
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1985).
89. Id. § 28-22-04.
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exemptions for the heads of families9" or single persons. 91
The creditor spouse is now subject only to the absolute
exemptions, but these exemptions are the most important in terms
of the amount of property a former spouse can shelter. The debtor
spouse can claim as an absolute exemption a homestead consisting
of $80,000 equity in land and a house. 92 Additional absolute
exemptions include wearing apparel, 93  provisions and fuel
necessary for one year, 94 the crops and grain raised on up to 160
acres of land either owned or rented by the claimant, 95 a house
trailer or mobile home occupied as a residence, 96 and any proceeds
from insurance covering absolutely exempt property. 97
Although the monetary value of the property a farmer or other
debtor may claim as exempt can be substantial,98 the law requires a
creditor, including a former spouse, to look to nonexempt assets to
satisfy the debt. Often, nonexempt property upon which a creditor
can execute does not exist; but even if nonexempt assets do exist,, a
creditor can levy only upon the debtor's equity in this property.
Consequently, a debtor can shelter property that might not
otherwise fall into an exempt category by reducing his equity
through the skillful use of encumbrances and statutory liens. 99
90. Id. 28-22-03.
91. Id. 28-22-05.
92. Id. § 28-22-02(7), 47-18-01. The statute requires that all property claimed as a homestead
be contiguous; there is no limit on acreage. See id. § 47-18-01. So long as the parcels of property are
adjoining and the debtor's equity does not exceed the sum of $80,000, it is possible to claim an entire'
farm as a homestead. See id.
93. Id. § 28-22-02(5). There is no dollar limitation or other restriction on the clothing exemption
allowed a debtor. See id.
94. Id. § 28-22-02(6). This exemption states that the provisions may either be "provided or
growing, or both." Id. Given the Seablom mandate for liberally construing exemption laws in favor of
the debtor, it might be possible to claim a fuel and food exemption for moneys specifically set aside in
a separate bank account for these expenditures. Cf Gray v. Brunold, 140 Cal. 615, 74 P. 303 (1903)
(although California law did not provide an exemption for money with which to purchase family
provisions, money that the debtors actually spent in good faith for family provisions did qualify for
the exemption).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02(8) (Supp. 1985). The exemption applies to crop areas, not to
the value of the crop. The crops and grains grown on up to 160 acres of debtor-owned or rented land
are absolutely exempt regardless of value or production costs. See id.
96. Id. § 28-22-02(10). It is not readily apparent how this mobile home exemption relates to the
homestead permitted by law. The homestead statute allows the debtor to claim as exempt property a
dwelling house and land together with appurtenances and all other improvements, the total equity
not to exceed $80,000. Id. § 47-18-01. Although the mobile home exemption does not state that it is
i lieu of the homestead exemptions, it might be so interpreted by the courts. Because courts are to
liberally construe North Dakota exemption statutes, it might thus be possible for the debtor to claim
both a homestead and mobile home exemption.
97. Id. § 28-22-02(9).
98. The $80,000 homestead and exemption for crops grown on 160 acres are certainly not
insignificant. Conceding that the value of the crop exemption will ultimately depend upon such
factors as quality of soil, particular crop grown, weather, and market prices, all of which may be
beyond the debtor spouse's control, this exemption is nevertheless a valuable one and affords great
potential for sheltering assets.
99. When docketed, ajudgment becomes a lien of record against the real property of lie debtor.
Id. § 28-20-13. The general statutes relating to liens apply to both mortgages and judgment liens. Id.
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Consensual liens that accompany extensions of credit are one
means of reducing equity. Many farmers have lines of credit with
local banks or other lending institutions. 100 Loans from these
institutions can be secured with crops, equipment, and land as
collateral. 10 1 By securing the debt, a farmer reduces his equity in
the property and shelters it from execution by his former spouse.
§35-01-01 (1980). Unless a statutory preference is given, liens upon the same property have priority
according to the time of their creation. Id. § 35-01-14. Judgment liens are given no statutory
preference. See id. S 28-20-13 (Supp. 1985). Judgment liens, therefore, are inferior to prior liens of
record.
The judgment lien creditor occupies an inferior position with respect to persons holding a
security interest on the debtor's personal property. Levying upon personalty gives rise to a lien, not
docketing a judgment. Id. § 28-21-13 (1974); Towne v. Sautter, 326 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1982).
Consequently, a personal property security interest prefected prior to levy would have preference
over an earlierjudgment lien.
100. The Seablom case is an example of the seasonal borrowing common to farmers. At the
March 28, 1983, show cause hearing, Mr. Seablom testified about his seasonal line of credit and post
judgment borrowing:
Q. Would it be a fair statement to say then that at the end of the crop season of
'82 you owed the Buxton State Bank approximately $167,000.00?
A. At the end of the '82 crop?
Q. Right.
A. No, that isn't true.
Q. If you paid them $50,000.00 and you still owe them $117,000.00 and you
haven't borrowed any more money since you paid them the $50,000.00, you must
have owed them the $167,000.00?
A. Pardon me. I borrowed $20,000.00 right before the first of the year to pay for
feed and fertilizer for this year so I wouldn't have to pay so much income tax.Q. So you have incurred $20,000.00 for operating expenses?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, what is your line of credit at the Buxton State Bank?
A. What do you mean?
Q. How much could you owe at the State Bank of any of the bank officers, John,
you can borrow up to $100.00 and that is all you can borrow here or is it sort of an
open ended line ofcredit?
A. It's always been more or less an open deal, if I need to borrow money for
operating.
Q. So if you need money, you can get it?
A. Yes.
Appendix to Brief at 76-77, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). Since Mr. Seablom
apparently experienced little difficulty in obtaining credit and encumbering his assets, it is likely
other debtor spouses may do the same. If the Seablomjudgmcnt can be rendered unenforceable by this
practice, then many more executory property divisions are exposed to the same danger.
101. The North Dakota Legislature recently provided for a "collateral real estate mortgage."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-17 (Supp. 1985). This mortgage is specifically intended to secure
commercial and agricultural loans, as well as lines of credit. The mortgage is good for a period of five
years but can be renewed for an additional five-year period. See id.
With the collateral real estate mortgage, a creditor can advance funds at some future time and
have them secured with a mortgage of a much earlier date. Id. The mortgage continues in effect if
there is no outstanding indebtedness. Id. These features allow a succession of seasonal borrowing and
repayment, and assures the creditor of having priority in the security.
A security interest in crops and personal property may be created by the debtor if he delivers
possession to the creditor. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 35-06-01 to -11 (1980 & Supp. 1985); § 41-09-26
(Supp. 1985). Personal property can also serve as collateral through use ofa financing agreement. See
id. §41-09-23 (Supp. 1985).
Mr. Seablomn testified at the show cause hearing that he had pledged all of his crops as security
for seasonal extensions of credit:
Q. John, as your crop gets sold, where does the money go?
A. To the bank.
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The debtor spouse can use the borrowed money for prepaid land
rent, seed, or fertilizer, which in turn are not subject to execution.
North Dakota has many statutory liens. 102 The statutory liens
related to agriculture are especially useful in reducing a former
husband's equity in nonexempt property. There are liens for
threshing;'0 3 fuel;' 0 4 fertilizer, farm chemicals, and seed; 10 5 sugar
beet production;' 0 6 and crop production. 107 These liens all attach to
the crop eventually produced or harvested.' 0 8 The crop production
lien also attaches to the land upon which the crop is grown.' 0 9
These liens are perfected by filing,"10 and they have priority over
other security interests including consensual liens."'
Q. The bank has all your crop secured?
A. Yes.
Appendix to Briefat 82, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
102. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 8-05-09 (1975) (carrier's lien); 35-07-01 (Supp. 1985)
(threshing lien); 35-08-01 (1980) (crop production lien); 35-08-04 (1980) (agriculture fuel lien); 35-
09-01 (1980) (fertilizer, farm chemicals, and seed lien); 35-10-01 (1980) (sugar beet production lien);
35-13-01 (1980) (repairman's lien); 35-15-01 (1980) (miner's lien); 35-17-01 (1980) (agister's lien);
35-18-01 (1980) (hospital lien); 35-19-01 (Supp. 1985) (innkeeper's lien); 35-20-01 (1980) (vendor of
real property lien); 35-20-05 (1980) (vendor of personalty lien); 35-20-06 (1980) (factor's lien); 35-20-
08 (1980) (attorney's lien); 35-20-12 (1980) (house mover's lien); 35-27-02 (1980) (mechanic's lien);
41-07-15 (1983) (warehouseman's lien); 58-13-03 (1983) (poundmaster's lien); 61-21-52 (1960)
(drain assessment lien). For background on North Dakota's statutory liens, see generally Laurence,
A Survey of Statutory Liens in North Dakota, 1 U.N.D. L. FACULTYJ. 100 (1982).
103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-07-01 (Supp. 1985). The lien arises from the threshing or drying of
grain and applies to the owner or lessee of the threshing machine, combine, or grain dryer. Id. The
lien runs to the grain actually harvested or dried, and the creditor waives the lien unless he files it
within 90 days after the harvesting or drying is completed. Id. 5 35-07-02.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-08-04 (1980). Anyone who furnishes gasoline, diesel, or other
motor fuel to another for the production of an agricultural crop is entitled to a lien upon all crops the
farmer produces with that fuel. Id. The lien is created by filing, which the creditor may do any time
after delivery of the fuel, but no later than November 1 of that year. Id.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-09-01 (1980). Suppliers or applicators of fertilizer, farm chemicals,
or seeds are given a lien on the crop finally produced. Id. The lien is in the amount of the purchase
price of the product supplied, and is waived unless the creditor files within 90 days of supplying or
applying. Id. § 35-09-02.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-10-01 (1980). All credit, labor, or supplies used in sugar beet
production are subject to a lien. Id. The sugar beet production lien covers those who provide seed
and fertilizer, harvesting labor, and hauling, as well as those who loan money or otherwise extend
any services necessary for the production of sugar beets. Id. The lien extends to the crop produced,
and the creditor waives it unless he files within 60 days of contracting. Id. § 35-10-02.
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-08-01 (1980). A county or federal agency that either provides or
advances money for seed, feed, fuel, or repairs on farm equipment necessary for crop production is
entitled to a lien upon the crop. Id. The agency must file the lien within 30 days of furnishing the
moneys or supplies. Id. § 35-08-02.
108. See supra notes 103-107.
109. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-29-25 (1976).
110. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-29-25 (1976) (county auditor files contract for aid in register of
deeds office); 35-07-02 (Supp. 1985) (thresher or dryer files statement in register of deeds office in
county in which grain was grown); 35-08-02 (1980) (officer files statement in register of deeds office
in county in which the items are used); 35 -08-04 (1980) (supplier files statement in register of deeds
office of county in which the crop is produced); 35-09-02 (1980) (supplier or applicator files statement
in register of deeds office in county in which fertilizer, farm chemicals, or seed is spread, applied,
sown or planted); 35-10-02 (1980) (contracting party files contract in register of deeds office in county
in which crop is to be grown).
111. Threshing liens are superior to all other liens and encumbrances, including mortgages.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-07-03 (Supp. 1985). Crop production liens have a priority over all liens and
encumbrances except threshing liens. Id. § 35-08-03 (1980). Liens for fertilizer, farm chemicals, and
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Agricultural loans and statutory liens permit a debtor spouse
to continue farming through extensions of credit. The persons or
businesses extending credit obtain security in land, crops, or other
personalty, and the owner's equity can be diminished so that
nothing remains upon which a creditor spouse may execute. 1I2 The
use of these equity-reducing procedures only applies to crops or
property not otherwise exempt. There is no reason to reduce equity
on the $80,000 homestead or the crops grown on 160 acres of land
since this property is absolutely exempt.1 1 3 A debtor spouse would
therefore direct efforts toward reducing equity in equipment,
which is generally heavily financed, crops grown on excess acreage,
and non-homestead realty. 1 4
With the intelligent selection and use of the exemptions
provided by law, a debtor spouse can farm indefinitely without
being subject to execution, while maintaining a normal and
comfortable standard of living. The creditor spouse, on the other
hand, may not be so fortunate. The creditor spouse, who
frequently receives none of the income-producing property, is often
a middle-aged woman lacking employment skills. She cannot
afford to wait to collect her judgment. 11 5 Each day the moneys go
seed are ranked below crop production and threshing liens, but are considered of a higher priority
than all other liens and encumbrances. Id. S 35-09-03. Sugar beet liens are superior to all liens except
the crop production lien. Id. § 35-10-01. The fuel lien is subservient to a threshing lien, farm labor
lien, crop production lien, and seed lien, but to no other encumbrances. Id. § 35-08-04. See, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank ofFessenden v. Weiss, 54 N.D. 371, 209 N.W. 780 (1926) (farm laborer's lien is superior
to prior chattel mortgage); Rogers Lumber Co. v. Schatzel, 52 N.D. 837, 204 N.W. 854 (1925)
(thresher's lien is superior to mortgagee's claims).
112. The new collateral real estate mortgage is a particularly adept method of obtaining credit
and reducing equity. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-17 (Supp. 1985). Mr. Seablom, for example,
testified that his assets were encumbered in excess of value:
Q. As far as you know, you are loaned up at First State Bank, is that not correct?
A. Yes.
Q. As a matter of fact, when they made this last loan to you, they had to inflate
the value of your assets in order to show a positive net worth, is that correct?
A. That's true.
Q. They had to value your land at roughly $1,000.00 an acre in order to somehow
show a positive net worth?
A. Yes.
Q. I imagine they are forced to do that so they don't get into trouble with the
examiners, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Appendix to Brief at 84-85, Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984). This ability to
borrow and encumber property greatly contributed to the unenforceability of the judgment in
Seablom.
113. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02(7), (8) (Supp. 1985).
114. Renting acreage is an especially useful method of shielding assets. Someone else owns the
land so there is nothing to execute upon. Notwithstanding the creditor spouse's judgment, a debtor
spouse can pledge a crop grown on rented land as collateral for agricultural loans, and use the
proceeds from this crop to offset production expenses on exempt land. The net effect is that the
debtor spouse can use the rented land's crop production to pay all farming expenses, and retain the
crop off another parcel as an absolute exemption.
115. Mrs. Seablom is in such a dire financial state, See supra note 46 for the trial court's
description of Carole Seablom's financial condition.
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unpaid her financial position worsens, and she gradually
approaches the point where her options become either to settle for a
sum substantially less than the judgment amount, or cease further
efforts to collect.
B. DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
The Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy
Code) provides that any debt owed to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor for alimony, maintenance, or support is
nondischargeable." 16 The same cannot be said for the property-
splitting provisions of a divorce decree. Whether created by
agreement of the parties or from a determination by the court,
judgment obligations representing a division of marital property
are dischargeable. 117  Furthermore, because North Dakota's
statutory exemptions are specifically made applicable to
bankruptcy," 8 Seablom affords the debtor spouse an opportunity to
discharge his obligations under a property division while retaining
the assets received from the marital estate.
A debtor spouse need not be insolvent to declare
bankruptcy."19 Nor must the former husband offend all of his
creditors by filing for bankruptcy; he can elect to discharge only the
property-splitting obligations which he owes to his former
spouse. 120 The debtor spouse can also retain possession of property
116. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982). What constitutes nondischargable alimony, maintenance, or
support is determined under federal bankruptcy law, not state law. In reSpong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Miller, 17 Bankr. 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). Debts otherwise deemed to be
nondischargable support become dischargable when assigned to another entity. 11 U.S.C.
523(a)(5)(A) (1982).
117. See 11 U.S.C. §5 523(a)(5)(A), 727(b) (1982). See also Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186,
189 (9th Cir. 1956). In Goggans, the former husband's judgment obligations to pay creditors and to
pay $26,000 to his wife in installments were deemed to be dischargeable property distributions. Id. at
189. Goggans was decided under the predecessor to the Code, but the principle expounded in that
decision remains unchanged. See In re Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385, 386 (W.D. Okla. 1981). See generally
Comment, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Dischargeability of Obligations Incurred Under Property
Settlements, Separation Agreements, and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 520 (1983) (discusses and
compares the law under Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the present Code).
118. See 11 U.S.C. 5 522(b) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983).
119. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(26), 301 (1982). For a debtor spouse to declare bankruptcy, it is
sufficient that his liabilities exceed the value of his nonexempt property; he need not be unable to pay
his debts as they become due. Id. § 101(26)(A).
120. See id. § 524(c). The debtor spouse can choose to reaffirm certain debts, thus enabling him
to select those creditors providing crop production loans.
121. See id. § 522(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983). Retention of the property of
the marital estate was in fact the eventual scenario played out in the Seablom litigation.
property of the marital estate was in fact the eventual scenario played out in the Seablom litigation.
While the appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court was pending, Mr. Seablom and his new
wife filed a joint Chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
North Dakota. See Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 923. The Seabloms scheduled two unsecured creditors for
discharge in their bankruptcy petition. One creditor was a Minnesota mail-order concern; John
Seablom's former wife, Carole, was the other. See In re Seablom, 45 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. D.N.D.
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he received from the marital estate if that property qualifies for an
exemption provided by law. 121 But the main determinant of a
former husband's ability to discharge the property-splitting
obligations of a judgment and not surrender assets is his wife's
status as either a secured or unsecured creditor. 122
If the creditor spouse is fortunate enough to have mortgages or
other consensual security interests guaranteeing payment of the
judgment obligations, the bankruptcy court will honor these
encumbrances. 12 3 However, many divorce decrees are entered by a
district court without a consensual lien from the debtor spouse. In
these cases, the debtor spouse's ability to discharge his obligations
and retain the property will depend upon the existence of a
nonconsensual security interest.
Some jurisdictions authorize the divorce court to impose a
mortgage upon any real property awarded to the husband. 124 Once
created, these mortgage liens cannot be avoided in bankruptcy. 125
North Dakota district courts do not seem to have such authority. 126
1984). Following an adversary hearing, the bankruptcy court held that John Seablom's $400
monthly payment was in the nature of a property settlement and therefore dischargeable. Id. at 450.
The bankruptcy court also held that Carole Seablom retained a lien against the farmland as security
for payment of the $25,000 lump sum portion of the property settlement. Id. at 452. Cf In re Butts,
46 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (bankruptcy court imposed constructive trust for unsecured
creditor wife after her former husband acquired transfer of marital estate upon his promise to make a
deferred property-splitting payment).
Although Carole Seablom retains a security interest in the marital real property, it is not clear
how she will obtain access to the collateral. Her husband's lack of equity in the farmland, combined
with the exemption laws, seems to preclude foreclosing on the collateral. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-
22-01 (Supp. 1985) (if the property qualifies for an exemption, it is exempt from any "final process
issued from any court"). Mrs. Seablom could possibly argue that she possesses an ownership interest
in the farmland and bring an action for quiet title. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-17-01 (1976). Another
possible remedy is a partition action by the creditor spouse. See id. S 32-16-01 (partition is permitted
under North Dakota law when cotenants hold and are in possession of real or personal property as
partners,joint tenants, or tenants in common).
122. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 522, 541(d) (1982). The property must qualify for some exemption.
A debtor spouse's nonexempt property automatically becomes part of the bankruptcy estate and will
pass to his creditors without a security interest attached. See Browne v. San Luis Obispo Nat'l Bank,
462 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1972) (under the predecessor Bankruptcy Act of 1898, equity in excess of
the homestead allowance formed part of the bankruptcy estate and was not exempt).
123. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 522, 541(d) (1982); In re Erwin, 25 Bankr. 363, 366 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982).
124. The Minnesota Legislature has, for example, granted the courts of that state the power to
impose a mortgage in divorce proceedings:
Mortgage means any instrument, including a decree of marriage dissolution or an
instrument made pursuant to it, creating or evidencing a lien of any kind on property,
given or taken as security for a debt, notwithstanding such debt may also be secured in
part by a lien upon personalty.
MINN. STAT. ANN. S 287.01 (Supp. 1985).
125. See In re Boyd, 31 Bankr. 591, 595-96 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
126. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-01 (1980) (a mortgage on real property must be a "writing,
executed with the formalities required in the case of a grant of real property"). North Dakota courts
are authorized to convey title to realty by judgment. N.D.R. Civ. P. 70. The district courts of this
state are required to make an "equitable distribution of the real" property when a divorce is
granted. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-05-24 (1981). This rule and statutory directive may permit North
Dakota courts to impose a judicial mortgage. Cf In re Scott, 12 Bankr. 613, 617-18 (Bankr. W.D.
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North Dakota district courts can impose a lien for securing
payments pursuant to a divorce judgment. 127  Under the
Bankruptcy Code these liens appear to be judicial liens.12 8 Judicial
liens are not mortgages. 12 9 To the extent they impair an exemption
to which he is entitled by law, a debtor spouse can avoid judicial
liens under the Bankruptcy Code. 130 It is therefore possible that any
lien imposed by a North Dakota court to secure a property division
is avoidable in bankruptcy. 131
Docketing a judgment in North Dakota creates a lien against
the debtor's real property. 132 A lien likewise exists when a creditor
levies upon personal property with a writ of execution. 133 But a
creditor spouse does not enjoy a secured status from either of these
encumbrances. Under Seablom, such liens are subject to exemptions
from execution. 134 In addition, the Bankruptcy Code considers
these to be judicial liens, 135 and thus potentially avoidable. 136
avoidable. 136
A purchase money creditor relationship arises when property
is sold to the buyer on credit. 137 Purchase money creditors are
excepted from and specifically not subject to the exemptions from
execution.1 38 Seablom determined that the wife was subject to the
statutory exemptions. 139 A creditor spouse is not, therefore, a
Okla. 1981) (speculating that similar legislation might vest the Oklahoma courts with the authority
to impose a mortgage to secure a division of the marital estate).
127. Wiedrich v. Wiedrich, 179 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1970). The supreme court in Wiedrich
specifically approved the use of a lien to secure payment of support, alimony, and a cash-based
property division. Id. at 732.
128. See 11 U.S.C. S 101(27) (1982). The Bankruptcy Code defines "judicial lien" as a "lien
obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceedings." Id.
129. InreCarr, 18 Bankr. 794, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l) (1982); In re Carr, 18 Bankr. at 796. Similarly, a debtor can avoid
consensual but nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in otherwise exempt animals,
crops, and implements or tools of the trade. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), (B) (1982); In re Liming, 22
Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982) (farmer permitted to discharge debt and avoid local bank's
security interest in tractor).
131. See In re Maness, 17 Bankr. 76 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (court-imposed lien was an
avoidable judicial lien, but debtor spouse was not entitled to keep the property). But see In reBoyd, 31
Bankr. 591 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (liens contained in divorce judgments were either a permissible
security interest within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(38) or an 11 U.S.C. § 101(39) statutory
lien).
132. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-13 (Supp. 1985).
133. Id. §28-21-13 (1974).
134. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925-26.
135. See, e.g., In re Reardon, 10 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (bank's judgment lien
against debtor's homestead was an avoidable judicial lien).
136. Id. at 700. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
137. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-07 (1983) (security interest taken by seller of collateral to
secure all or a part of its price is a purchase money security interest).
138. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-14 (1974) (property not exempt from execution in an action
for its purchase price); 28-22-17 (Supp. 1985) (North Dakota residents limited to claiming those
exemptions allowed under state law); 47-18-04(3) (Supp. 1985) (homestead subject to execution on
debt created for the purchase thereof).
139. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925-26.
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purchase money creditor even though it may appear that the debtor
spouse is purchasing the marital assets.
The creditor spouse may enjoy a secured position by retaining
title to the assets of the marital estate. Assuming title to property
does not pass with the judgment, a creditor spouse holds an
ownership interest that is cognizable in bankruptcy. 1 40 Conversely,
if the judgment does pass title without some security interest, a
debtor spouse may receive full ownership of the assets subject to a
property settlement obligation that is dischargeable.
Title to personal property usually passes with entry of
judgment. 141 The creditor spouse is at this time an unsecured
creditor subject to discharge. 142 Should the personalty qualify as
exempt property, the debtor spouse would retain it free of any
judgment obligations of payment. 4 3  While the granting or
awarding of assets in a divorce decree may be sufficient to pass title
to personal property, it is doubtful that such general language
conveys ownership to realty.
Where authorized by statute, a district court can pass title to
realty by judgment. 144 North Dakota district courts are empowered
to convey title to land through a judgment. 45 Some jurisdictions
hold that to transfer title, the judgment should at a minimum
declare that it will operate as a deed of conveyance and otherwise be
deed-like in format. 146 The North Dakota Supreme Court has yet to
state what is minimally required to convey title to land by
judgment. 147 District courts will have to resolve this question on a
case by case basis. In some instances a district court may determine
140. See 11 U.S.C. S 541 (1982). Property belonging to another is not part of the bankrupt's
estate. See South Central Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Security State Bank of Hedley, 614 F.2d 1056,
1061 (5th Cir. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 924-25. The person to whom personal property is awarded
by court decree can obtain possession through a writ of execution. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-21-04
(1974); N.D.R. Civ. P. 70.
142. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
144. See Henschke v. Young, 224 Minn. 339, 28 N.W.2d 766 (1947).
145. N.D.R. Civ. P. 70.
146. SeeSimmons v. Conklin, 129 Mich. 190, 192, 88 N.W. 625, 626 (1901).
147. The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure authorize district courts to convey title by
judgment when the real or personal property is located within the state. N.D.R. Civ. P. 70. The
argument can be made, however, that in order to convey title to land a judgment must not only
direct the parties to execute and deliver documents of title, but must also state that in the event a
party fails to deliver a deed or other title instrument, the judgment shall stand for, and in lieu of, a
deed of conveyance. See id.; Ellison v. Ellison, 70 N.D. 46, 54 N.W.2d 656-659 (1952). There is also
support for the proposition that a general grant of property in a divorce decree is sufficient to convey
title when the decree contains a legal description of the land. See Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271-
76 (N.D. 1982). But see Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 924 (the court decree indicated that wife was not to
deliver a deed until payment was received; she remained a secured party, and title did not pass to the
husband byjudgment).
322 [VOL. 61:301
1985] DIvISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE 323
that the creditor spouse retained ownership, while in others the
court may find that title has passed to the debtor spouse. For this
reason both the district court and counsel for the creditor spouse
should structure divorce decrees to alleviate the possibility of a
debtor spouse retaining assets received by judgment while
discharging payment obligations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
When the divorce is amicable and the parties agree to a
property distribution, Dvorak and Seablom pose little hazard.
Delivery and exchange of assets, deeds, and other documents of
title can be accomplished by the parties with relative ease and prior
to entry of judgment. If the settlement involves a money payment
subsequent to entry of judgment, it should be treated as any other
extension of credit.
The debtor spouse should execute a promissory note148
adequately secured with financing statements and mortgages.149
Counsel for the parties will probably address the matter of interest
on delayed payments, 150 and if the debtor spouse is to make
payments over many years, it might be advisable to use an
adjustable or flexible interest rate mortgage. 151
148. A property settlement should not be undertaken without thought to the possible tax
consequences. The exchange or transfer of assets pursuant to an agreed property division has
resulted in tax liability. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See generally Christensen,
Tax Aspects of Marriage Dissolution Under North Dakota Law, 56 N.D.L. REV. 163 (1980) (advocating
review of property settlements to determine tax implications). Congress has attempted to alleviate
many of the tax consequences associated with divorce in the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Section 421 of
the new tax law purports to make many transfers of property nontaxable when they are incident to a
divorce. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-389, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793-94 (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 1041). However, whether divorce will ever be totally without tax consequences remains
to be seen, for it certainly is not so under the new federal tax law. See id. § 422 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. §§ 71, 215) (setting forth requirements for spousal support to qualify as a deduction).
149. In arranging for collateral to secure the property division, counsel for the creditor spouse
should be concerned about preventing his client from becoming a junior encumbrancer. If the wife
takes a second mortgage or junior lien in the marital property, she may be unable to foreclose if she
does not have sufficient funds to buy out all prior lien holders in the event of her husband's default.
See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 35-01-14, -15, -17 (1980). Neither should counsel accept a security interest
without considering the husband's ability to avoid the lien under federal bankruptcy law. See 11
U.S.C. 522(f) (1982); supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Finally, if the creditor spouse
accepts an assignment of a mortgage or contract for deed as collateral, the security should be
perfected under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-09-01 to -53
(1983 & Supp. 1985). Perfection is required under Article 9 because the right to receive payments
from a real estate contract is personal property. See In re Freeborn, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424
(1980) (when right to real estate contract payments is assigned and legal title is not conveyed by deed,
assignee must file pursuant to Article 9 to have priority over subsequent lien creditors, purchasers,
and encumbrances).
150. Interest is necessary to insure that the wife receives the full value of the settlement. See Lien
v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436, 444 (S.D. 1979).
151. There are numerous indices for variable rate mortgages, and counsel should be careful to
select the one best suited for a particular client. See generally Browne, The Development and Practical
Application of the Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Adjustable
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If the property division is adversarial and performed by the
court, however, nothing short of additional legislative or judicial
action can remove all risk to enforcement created by Dvorak and
Seablorn. 152 Although it may not be possible to totally avoid the
impact of these. cases, there are procedures and techniques which
will greatly reduce the risk of obtaining an unenforceable property
division. Many of these procedures can only be implemented with
the aid of the district court, but this should not be difficult to
achieve. Since district courts are statutorily directed to make an
"equitable distribution" of the marital estate, 153 they should have
both a duty and a desire to see that their property divisions are
enforceable.
A. Lis PENDENS AND INTERIM ORDERS
Efforts at obtaining an enforceable property division must
commence with the action for divorce. As soon as the divorce
complaint is drawn, counsel for the plaintiff should file it and
record a notice of lis pendens in each county where the parties own
real property. 154 Defense counsel should file an answer and then
record a notice of lis pendens. 155
District courts are required to make an equitable distribution
of the marital estate when they grant a divorce, 156 and the North
Dakota Supreme Court has established guidelines for
accomplishing this equitable distribution. 157 But the ultimate
Rate Mortgage Loan Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 Mo. L. REv. 179 (1982)
(discussion of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation adjustable rate instrument); Bucki,
Variable Rate Instruments in New York State, 54 N.Y. ST. B. J. 510 (1982) (review of variable rate
mortgages and their use in New York). Counsel should also carefully structure the adjustable rate
mortgage to avoid violating the usury statute. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (Supp. 1985).
152. One obvious solution would have been for the legislature to amend the various exemption
statutes to provide that exemptions do not apply to a creditor spouse executing under the property
divisions in a judgment of divorce. Since the legislature failed to do this, perhaps it is time for the
courts to assume a more active role in correcting this injustice.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24(1981).
154. Id. § 28-05-07 (Supp. 1985). A notice of lis pendens is permitted inany district court civil
action affecting title to real property. Id. District courts are authorized to distribute the real property
of the parties upon the granting ofa divorce. Id. § 14-05-24 (1981). The district courts are also able to
impose a lien upon the real property of the parties to secure the payment of support or other moneys
ordered in the judgment. See, e.g., Wiedrich v. Wiedrich, 179 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1970). District
courts clearly have the power to affect title to real property in divorce actions, thus permitting the
filing ofa notice oflis pendens. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
155. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (Supp. 1985).
156. Id. § 14-05-24(1981).
157. See Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966); Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52
N.W.2d 107 (1952). These two cases first articulated the guidelines commonly referred to as the Ruff-
Fischer guidelines, which authorize a trial court to consider many factors in determining an equitable
distribution of the marital estate. See Urlaub v. Urlaub, 325 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 1982). The Ruff-
Fischer guidelines allow the district court to base a property division upon the ages of the parties, their
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division will depend upon the net worth of the parties at the date of
trial. 58 It is therefore imperative that no erosion of net worth takes
place from the time the plaintiff commences the action until trial. 5 9
A notice of lis pendens will help counsel prevent a pretrial reduction
of net worth from mortgages and consensual liens.
Recording of the lis pendens is "constructive notice" to
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property; they are
bound by all proceedings taken after the filing of the notice as
though they were a party to the actions."160 A notice of lis pendens
will certainly discourage further extensions of credit because the
creditor is no longer assured of a preferred position.1 6' Moreover,
even if one of the parties is able to encumber the marital real estate,
the district court can award the property to the other spouse free of
any mortgage or consensual lien obtained after the filing of a lis
pendens. 162
Along with the notice of lis pendens, counsel might preserve
the marital estate with an interim order from the district court. By
issuing an interim order, the district court can restrain or enjoin
both parties from disposing of or encumbering assets. 63 The
creditor spouse can request this order in her complaint or by
motion. 164 An interim order can be issued by the court ex parte, but
respective earning abilities, duration of the marriage, conduct of each party during the course of the
marriage, their station in life, circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical
condition, financial circumstances as shown by the property owned, the value of the property
including income-producing capacity, origins of the marital property, and any other material
matters. Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 757 (N.D. 1981).
158. A court considers the Ruff-Fischer guidelines only after it has determined the net worth of
the parties. See Graves v. Graves, 340 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1983); VanRosendale v.
VanRosendale, 333 N.W.2d 790, 791 (N.D. 1983); Urlaub, 325 N.W.2d at 237-38; Williams, 302
N.W.2d at 759; Hoge v. Hoge, 281 N.W.2d 557, 561 (N.D. 1979). The trial court's finding of net
worth represents what is available for distribution, and the Ruff-Fischer guidelines aid the court in
making the eventual distribution of the marital estate. See Urlaub v. Urlaub, 348 N.W.2d 454 (N.D.
1984).
159. For examples of methods for reducing equity that result in a reduction of net worth, see
supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
160. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-05-07 (Supp. 1985).
161. See id. With a collateral real estate mortgage, a creditor can advance credit at some future
time and secure the loan with a mortgage of an earlier date. See id. S 35-03-17. Consequently, if there
is a prior collateral real estate mortgage the mortgage might be able to extend credit subsequent to a
recorded notice of lis pendens. Such loans would arguably be free of and not subject to the lis
pendens.
Yet, even with a prior recorded mortgage the prudent creditor would have concerns about
extending additional credit when the property is involved in litigation. Therefore, counsel should
serve a copy of the notice of lis pendens upon all known mortgagecs. If a mortgagee persists in
extending credit notwithstanding actual notice of the action, there remains a question of the priority
of such loans. Cf Sarles v. McGee, 1 N.D. 365, 48 N.W. 231 (1891) (a senior encumbrancer is not
bound to respect the equitable rights of ajunior lien holder unless he has actual or constructive notice
of such rights).
162. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-05-07 (Supp. 1985). Cf Fannin Bank v. Blystone, 417 S.W.2d
502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (because filing of divorce action was deemed the equivalent of a notice of
lis pendens, the court was able to award the wife real property free of a mortgage executed by the
husband pendente life), aff'd on other grounds, 424 S.W.2d 626 (1968).
163. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05.1-09 (1974).
164. See id. § 32-06-02(1), -04 (1976); N.D.R.O.C. 8.2.
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the other party must subsequently be provided with an opportunity
to be heard. 165
B. REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
In addition to preserving net worth, counsel should likewise be
concerned with establishing that net worth at trial. Farmers and
other businesses depending upon borrowed moneys for operation
will commonly have seasonal lines of credit or similar financing
agreements with a local bank or other lending institutions. 166 These
tend to be long-term credit arrangements and, as a consequence,
the borrower must usually file an annual financial statement.
Annual financial statements, particularly the most recent one,
are often introduced at trial as evidence of the parties' net worth.
Unfortunately, the other spouse frequently appears and testifies to
a much lower net worth. The court must then determine the true
net worth from this conflicting evidence. 167 The use of requests for
admissions in conjunction with federal banking law can help
alleviate the problem of conflicting valuations of net worth.
Under federal law it is a felony to knowingly make any false
statement or report, or to willfilly overvalue any land, property, or
other security for the purpose of influencing actions upon a loan
application, purchase agreement, loan, discount, acceptance,
release, or substitution of security. 168 This law is applicable to
transactions with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Farm
Credit Administration, Farmers' Home Corporation, Farmers'
Home Administration, National Agricultural Credit Corporation,
Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Federal Land Bank and all
other agencies or institutions insured by either the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation or the Federal Deposit Insurance
165. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-06-07 (1976); N.D.R O.C. 8.2(f).
166. For an example of a debtor having a seasonal line of credit, see supra note 100.
167. See, e.g., Urlaub v. Urlaub, 348 N.W.2d 454, 456 (N.D. 1984); Klitzke v. Klitzke, 308
N.W.2d 385, 387 (N.D. 1981); Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 756 (N.D. 1981).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1982). Section 1014 reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues
any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Farm Credit Administration, Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation, Farmers' Home Corporation, the Secretary of Agriculture
acting through the Farmers' Home Administration, any Federal intermediate credit
bank, or any division, officer, or employee thereof, or of any corporation organized
under sections 1131-1134m of Title 12, or of any regional agricultural credit
corporation established pursuant to law, or of the National Agricultural Credit
Corporation, a Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a Federal Savings and Loan Association, a Federal
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Corporation. 169 A violation occurs with the making of the false
statement or overvaluation. 170 It is not necessary that the lending
institution actually make a loan or otherwise rely upon the
statement or overvaluation. 17  Nor is it necessary for the lending
institution to suffer a loss. 72 The offense is committed whether or
not the financial institution knew of or aided in the
overvaluation. 173
Assuming counsel obtains a copy of the most recent financial
statement and this statement presents a favorable net worth, he or
she can serve the following requests for admissions of fact and
genuineness of documents upon the other party:
REQUEST NUMBER ONE: Admit that the document
attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true, accurate, and
genuine copy of the financial statement you filed with the
First Bank of XYZ on August 24, 1985.
REQUEST NUMBER TWO: Admit that Exhibit B
attached hereto is a true, accurate and genuine copy of 18
U.S.C. § 1014(1982).
REQUEST NUMBER THREE: Admit that in construing
18 U.S.C. 5 1014, federal courts have held that the
offense consists of making a material false statement or
overvaluation of assets for the purpose of influencing the
actions of a federally insured bank or credit institution,
land bank, a Federal land bank association, a Federal Reserve bank, a small business
investment company, a Federal credit union, an insured state-chartered credit union,
any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, any bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, any member of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, or the Administrator of the National Credit Union
Administration, upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase
agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension
of any of the same, by renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance,
release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
169. Id. It is likely that most farming operations involve some credit arrangement with at least
one institution covered by 18 U.S.C. 5 1014.
170. United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944
(1978).
171. See United States v. Glassey, 715 F.2d 352, 353 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1032 (1983).
172. Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 6 (1938).
173. United States v. Bush, 599 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1979). Any bank officer or employee who
knowingly participated in or assented to an overvaluation of assets would be personally liable for all
damages sustained by the creditor spouse. See 12 U .S.C. S 503 (1982).
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United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1977); that the bank or lending
institution need not rely upon the false statement or
overvaluation, United States v. Glassey, 715 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 566 (1984); that the
lending institution need not suffer a loss for a violation to
occur, Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938); and that an
offense is committed even though the false statement or
overvaluation was given with the knowledge, consent, or
duplicity of a bank officer, United States v. Bush, 599 F.2d
72 (5th Cir. 1979).
REQUEST NUMBER FOUR: Admit that the First Bank
of XYZ comes within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(1982).
REQUEST NUMBER FIVE: Admit that as of August 24,
1985, Exhibit A was a true, correct and accurate
statement of your financial condition, including net
worth.
Once counsel extracts the preceding admissions,
interrogatories can be used to ascertain how, if at all, the net worth
has changed subsequent to the financial statement.1 4 If the wife's
attorney promptly records a notice of lis pendens, any alleged
changes in net worth will not likely be due to additional mortgages
or consensual liens. The adverse party will then have the difficult
burden of trying to convince the court that notwithstanding the
absence of additional debt, the marital estate has somehow been
drastically reduced in value since the date of the financial
statement. The closer the financial statement was made to the date
of trial, the more difficult this burden becomes.
C. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
In determining the amount of spousal support to award, a
174. Although this manner of obtaining a desired admission may be offensive to some, it is not
improper. There is no threat of criminal prosecution for civil advantage in violation of the
Disciplinary Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONStBILITY DR 7-105 (1984). This
procedure is not materially distinguishable from the acceptable practice of reminding a hostile
witness of perjury sanctions prior to commencing an interrogation. Neither are these requested
admissions objectionable because they call for opinions or conclusions of law. See N.D.R. Iv. P.
36(a) (permitting requests for admissions directed towards opinions of fact or the application of law
to facts). See also FED. R. Ciy. P. 36(a) advisory committee note (1970 amendments to federal rule
were intended to eliminate requirement that requests for admissions be confined to matters of fact).
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district court can consider both the financial circumstances of the
parties and the income-producing capacity of their respective share
of the marital estate. 17 5  Receipt of a substantial property
distribution will necessarily foreclose an award of spousal support
because the wife will have adequate means for her self-support.1 76
When the property division consists of a lump sum or installment
payments made after entry of judgment, however, the subsequent
unenforceability of such payments may give rise to a need for
support. To cover this contingency, counsel for the creditor spouse
should ask the court for an award of nominal spousal support or the
express reservation of jurisdjction on the matter of support. By
either granting nominal support or reserving jurisdiction, the court
can later modify the decree to provide for spousal support in the
event the husband does not make his property distribution
payments. 177
Court-ordered support obligations cannot be discharged by
the debtor spouse's resort to bankruptcy. 178 Failure to pay the
court-ordered support would likewise expose the debtor spouse to
civil contempt sanctions. 179  Support obligations can be
subsequently reduced or eliminated by the district court,18 0 but the
nondischargeable nature of spousal support and the ability to
compel payment are ample incentives for a creditor spouse to seek
broad support obligations from the other party.
Court-ordered payments to third parties is one area in which
counsel might consider requesting a designation of spousal support.
Divorce judgments often require a husband to pay creditors and
maintain health and other insurance for the benefit of his children
175. Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1982); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 209
(N.D. 1982).
176. See, e.g., Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 336 (entire amount of property distribution may be paid at
any time); Pankow, 347 N.W.2d at 568-69 (total sum of property distribution, if invested, would
convert the payment into income-producing property).
177. See Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 483-84 (N.D. 1978). A word of caution: general
reservations ofjurisdiction are not effective. Id. at 483. To award future alimony the trial court must
specifically state the reasons for reserving jurisdiction. See Kronforst v. Kronforst, 21 Wis. 2d 54, 123
N.W.2d 528, 535 (1963). If the property distribution subsequently becomes unenforceable, sufficient
grounds to modify the initial decree to permit an award of support may exist. Cf Nugent v. Nugent,
152 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1967) (when wife remarried and second husband assumed obligations of
support, the court properly terminated first husband's duty of support because the wife no longer
had need of it).
178. See 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(5) (1982).
179. See Raszler v. Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535 (N.D. 1956) (enforcement of the payment of
alimony may be obtained by citing the party charged with failure to pay support for contempt of
court); Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N .W.2d 554 (1949) (defendant found guilty of contempt
of court for failure to make support payments as provided in court order).
180. See Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 490 (N.D. 1978) (trial court order that former
wife's alimony terminate automatically upon her remarriage held proper); Hoster v. Hoster, 216
N.W.2d 698, 700 (N.D. 1974) (district courts have the power to modify amount to be paid under
divorce decree whenever there is a material change in circumstances).
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or former spouse. These obligations to third parties are interpreted
by courts to be property-splitting rather than true support. 181 This
not only renders the obligations dischargeable in bankruptcy, 182
but it may also deprive the court of civil contempt as a method of
enforcement. 183 Yet a creditor spouse might be successful in having
her former husband's obligations to third party creditors classified
as support if the court fashions the judgment in the following
manner: The judgment should designate payments to third party
creditors as spousal support, provide that the debtor spouse is to
pay the creditor spouse or creditor in the alternative, and include a
hold harmless provision in favor of the creditor spouse. 184
D. AWARDING INTEREST OR DISCOUNTING DEFERRED
PAYMENTS.
A division of the marital estate is designed to settle with
finality the property rights of the parties from the time the court
enters the judgment. 185 The judgment entitles each party to his or
her share as of that date. If the decree permits a husband to make a
property division by installments or a lump sum deferred payment,
the payments should, as a general rule, bear interest at the legal
rate; otherwise, the wife is not actually receiving the property
division to which she is entitled. 186 Consequently, whenever the
court is contemplating a deferred payment property division,
counsel should request that the court include interest on the
judgment moneys. 187
The current legal interest on indebtedness is six percent per
annum in North Dakota,1 8 but this rate is not binding upon the
court. If the rate of interest is an integral part of the overall plan for
181. See, e.g., Spence v. Spence, 290 Mich. 98, 287 N.W. 393 (1939) (husband's agreement to
carry insurance was a property settlement not enforceable with contempt).
182. See Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1956) (obligations created by property
settlement agreement may be discharged by bankruptcy); In re Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr.
W.D. Okal. 1981) (obligations created by property settlements or division of property of the parties
to a divorce action are dischargeable in bankruptcy).
183. See Spence v. Spence, 290 Mich. 98, 287 N.W. 393 (1939) (husband's agreement in divorce
decree to carry insurance for wife and to provide for her in his will were matters of property
settlement and could not be enforced in contempt proceeding).
184. See Stamper v. Stamper, 17 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (under Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, court-ordered payments to creditors could be considered nondischargeable
support when the judgment contains a hold harmless provision in favor of the wife); Cf Hodous v.
Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N.W.2d 554 (1949) (court cannot properly order payment of suit money
directly to attorney, but the order may provide for alternative payment to former spouse or
attorney).
185. See Holt v. Holt, 84 S.D. 671, 176 N.W.2d 51 (1970).
186. Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436, 444 (S.D. 1979).
187. See, e.g., Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1979).
188. N.D. CENT. ConE S 47-14-05 (Supp. 1985).
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a property division, the court can set interest above 189 or below' 90
the legal rate, or provide for no interest at all. 191 When no interest is
allowed the court must discount the deferred payment and re-
examine the overall property division. 192
Discounting refers to a reduction of the deferred payment to its
present value. Present value represents what the creditor spouse is
actually receiving as her share of the marital estate. The court must
determine whether this lesser sum also constitutes an equitable
division.1 93 If the lesser sum is not equitable, the discounting of
deferred payments may compel the court to increase a wife's share
of the marital estate. 94
E. SECURING PAYMENT OF A PROPERTY DIVISION
The district court can arrive at an equitable property division
by adhering to the guidelines enunciated by the supreme court. 195
Counsel and the court can achieve an enforceable division in
several ways. First, the court should attempt a distribution by the
award of specific assets. 196 When necessary, the court can order
property sold and can distribute the proceeds. 197 The court can
likewise grant the divorce but delay entering judgment on the
property division until the parties have completed all necessary
actions and transfers. 198
189. See Klitzke v. Klitzke, 308 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1981). A court cannot set interest above the
statutory rate on judgments. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Iowa 1981). In
North Dakota, the legal rate of interest on judgments is 12 %. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-34 (Supp.
1985).
190. See Lien, 278 N.W.2d at 444.
191. See Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 336 n. 1.
192. Pankow, 347 N.W.2d at 568-69; Tuff, 333 N.W.2d at 424.
193. Pankow, 347 N.W.2d at 568-69; Tuff, 333 N.W.2d at 424.
194. See Lippert, 353 N.W.2d at 336. In Lippert the parties had a net worth of $470,000 consisting
primarily of a farm, which was awarded to the husband. Id. at 335. The wife's share of the estate was
a $34,000 inheritance; a lump sum payment of $40,000 to be made within 120 days of entry of
judgment, plus an additional $200,000 payable without interest in $10,000 annual installments over
a period of 20 years. Id. The husband challenged this property division as being inequitable, but any
inequity that existed would have accrued to the wife rather than the husband. Id. at 336, 336 n. 1.
Assuming a 10% rate of return, the $200,000 in deferred payments had a present value of
approximately $85,135.64. Mrs. Lippert's share of the estate was actually $159,135.64 instead of the
$274,000 figure used by the court. Discounting could have resulted in an increased award to Mrs.
Lippert upon remand.
195. See supra note 157.
196. Prior to entry ofjudgment, transfers of assets can be enforced with civil contempt. See N.D.
CENT. CODE S 27-10-03(3) (1974). After entry of judgment pursuant to a property settlement
agreement, execution is the remedy for obtaining possession. See id. S 28-21-03; N.D.R. Civ. P. 70.
197. See, e.g., Freitag v. Freitag, 318 N.W.2d 760, 762 (N.D. 1982). The trial court should
avoid a sale of the marital estate if it will destroy or damage the ability of one of the parties to earn a
livelihood, or otherwise significantly lessen the value of the property. See Urlaub, 325 N.W.2d at 238
n.2; Williams, 302 N.W.2d at 760 n.3.
198. District courts have broad discretion in divorce proceedings, including the power to
separate the granting of a divorce from a disposition of property. See Miller v. Miller, 616 P.2d 313,
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Second, if there is to be a post-judgment cash payment to one
of the parties, the court can require that security be given. 199 It is a
simple matter for the trial court to order the debtor spouse to
execute promissory notes, mortgages, and financing statements.200
A refusal to comply with this order would subject the debtor spouse
to the district court's civil contempt authority. 201
If the parties own assets jointly, the court and counsel can
draft the judgment so that title to the property will not pass until the
wife receives all property-splitting payments. The court and
counsel should draft the judgment so it segregates the assets
according to whether or not title is to pass prior to payment. The
divorce decree must clearly state the court's intentions regarding
title transfer. If unencumbered title is to pass to one of the parties
irrespective of payments, the judgment should so provide. 20 2 A
separate paragraph of the divorce decree should be used to dispose
of encumbered assets. 203
The court can also impose a lien upon the property awarded to
the debtor spouse.2 0 4 There is a danger, though, that a bankruptcy
judge might consider this an avoidable judicial lien rather than a
mortgage. 20 5 Since it is not absolutely certain that North Dakota
district courts cannot impose a mortgage lien, 20 6 any court-ordered
318 (Mont. 1980). Cf Pankow, 347 N.W.2d at 569 (affirming judgment as to the granting of divorce
but reversing and remanding on support and property division).
199. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-25 (Supp. 1985). This statute also permits the court to turn over
property to a receiver for management. See Schumacher v. Schumacher, 242 N.W.2d 136 (N.D.
1976).
200. See, e.g., Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 652 n. 1 (1979) (trial court ordered property
division requiring defendant to execute promissory note for $152,476 plus 7% simple interest);
Ellison v. Ellison, 79 N.D. 46, 50, 54 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1952) (lien imposed on real property
awarded to defendant to insure payment of defendant's share of transcript).
201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-03(3) (1974); see also Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909)
(contempt proceedings may be used to compel obedience of court order to transfer legal title);
Schaheen v. Schaheen, 17 Mich. App. 147, 169 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1969) (husband guilty of
contempt for refusing to convey property in accordance with divorce decree).
202. A general distribution clause of the type used in Seablom would accomplish this for personal
property. See supra note 33 for text of the Seablom property provision. Such general language may not
be sufficient to convey title to real property. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
203. To clearly indicate that title does not pass until all necessary payments are made, the court
may want to include the following or similar language in thejudgment:
PROPERTYA WARDED TO DEFENDANT
Upon compliance with the provisions of this judgment, including payment of all
required sums and moneys to plaintiff and creditors, defendant will receive certain
additional assets as his exclusive property. Thus, following receipt by plaintiff or
creditors of all payments due under this judgment, she shall execute and deliver all
instruments and conveyances necessary to vest defendant with title to the following
property:
204. Wiedrich v. Wiedrich, 179 N.W.2d 728, 732 (N.D. 1970).
205. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
206. See Wiedrich, 179 N.W.2d at 732. In Wiedrich the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's imposition of a lien against the marital real estate to secure payments required under a
divorce decree, but it did not term this lien a mortgage. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
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lien should be designated a "mortgage lien." This lien should
also comply with the technical requirements for a consensual
mortgage and should include language to the effect that it is not
subject to statutory exemptions from execution.20 7 If the lien is
structured in the foregoing manner, a bankruptcy court might
interpret it as ajudicial mortgage °. 2 0
It is highly unlikely that the court would impose a lien upon
personal property, but it can do so. 20 9 If an asset is jointly owned
under a document of title, the court can order that the parties retain
co-ownership as a form of security. 210
Use of the contingent or stand-by line of credit is a final
method of insuring that the creditor spouse obtains an enforceable
property division. This procedure requires the debtor spouse to
obtain a line of credit with a local bank, which will become
operative in the event he misses a payment to the former spouse.
Any time the debtor spouse misses a payment, regardless of the
reason, the bank will pay the creditor spouse and charge the debtor
spouse's account.
The collateral and terms necessary to establish this contingent
credit plan are matters for the debtor spouse and the banker to
resolve. The creditor spouse's only concerns are that once
established, this line of credit becomes irrevocable; that the credit
arrangement is completed prior to entry of the divorce decree; that
the bank's payments are automatically triggered by the debtor
spouse's default; and that all bank payments under this stand-by
credit plan are without recourse. With such an arrangement the
creditor spouse might be safe in accepting a deferred payment
settlement of the property rights.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not possible to state what the final impact of Dvorak and
Seablom will be upon the enforcement of property divisions, but it is
possible at this time to make some general predictions. For many
previously held that unless the parties agree to the imposition of a mortgage to secure obligations in a
divorce decree, a district court lacks the authority to create a mortgage by judgment. Leifert v.
Wolfer, 74 N.D. 746, 756, 24 N.W.2d 690, 694-95 (1946).
207. See, e.g., In reBoyd, 31 Bankr. 5.91, 595 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
208. See id. See also In re Scott, 12 Bankr. 613, 617-18 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (speculating
that mortgages to secure a division of the marital estate might be created under Oklahoma law).
209. Unless specifically excluded, security interests in personal property are governed by
chapter 41-09 ofthe North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-01-04 (Supp. 1985). There
is an exception for court imposed liens on personal property. See id. § 41-09-04(8) (1983).
210. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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unsecured judgments already in existence, enforceability of cash-
based property distributions will depend upon the ingenuity and
nerve of the debtor spouse and his counsel in avoiding payment. As
to divorce decrees entered after Dvorak and Seablom, the
collectability of money payments will largely depend upon the
sagacity of both the wife's attorney and the district court in
securing these obligations. It is disturbing that the enforcement of a
marital property distribution has been reduced to such an
adversarial state with the district court in an advocate's role, but
there is no other solution until either the North Dakota Legislature
or the North Dakota Supreme Court terminates the obvious
injustice that will be the principal legacy of these cases.
